TRAINING NOTES



Peace Operations

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Since the end of the cold war, our environment has been volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Order and predictability have been replaced by disorder, even chaos, or "the new world order"—what one observer has called "the old world disorder in new configurations." We no longer have a specific enemy, and we find ourselves searching for our role in this new world order. Although the possibility still exists for major conflict in certain areas, it is far more likely that we will find ourselves in peacekeeping, peacemaking, or peace-enforcement operations.

The word *peacekeeping* itself is complex and ambiguous for us, because we have little experience in training soldiers for such missions. Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire that has been agreed upon by two or more former combatants. It usually denotes an atmosphere in which peace exists and the former combatants, to some extent, prefer peace to continued conflict.

Peacemaking is essentially settling the disputes of others. The United Nations uses this term to mean the diplomatic process of negotiating peace. This definition causes a great deal of confusion for the American public, however, because combat units may be required to impose a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants.

Peace-enforcement is a term used by the Joint Staff to mean the physical interposition of armed forces to separate two combatants who are still fighting.

The most effective way to train for any of these operations is in a battalion task force with all its attached combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements.

Traditionally, peacekeeping operations have required lightly armed forces—with only small arms for self defense—because of an existing cease-fire or treaty. An excellent example of a peacekeeping operation is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai in Egypt. In the MFO, the mission is to observe and report any violations of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Missions in this operation include establishing and manning roadblocks, checkpoints, and observation posts; identifying Egyptian and Israeli ships, aircraft, and vehicles; reporting; and small-unit patrolling, as well as establishing a base camp and logistical base to support all of these operations. The implied missions could also include riot control, mine clearing, defensive operations, and working as part of a coalition.

Some of these tasks are inherent to the infantry battalion task force mission (reporting, small unit patrolling, defensive operations, base camp operations, and logistical support). A task force would need to conduct refresher training on these tasks before assuming the mission, and they should not take up a great deal of additional training time. Working and training as a task force will establish the relationships needed to function effectively when deployed.

Additional training time will be spent on actions associated with a peacekeeping operation (roadblocks, checkpoints, observation posts, vehicle/aircraft/ship identification, riot control, mine clearing, and the command and control of working with a coalition force).

Vehicle/aircraft/ship identification can be mastered as concurrent training and can easily be integrated into any training program.

Command and control procedures with coalition forces can be trained with leaders only participating in a tactical exercise without troops, or they may be incorporated into a command post exercise, map exercise, or communications exercise. This training needs to be executed with all task force leaders present. The missions that will require soldier-intensive training are roadblocks,

checkpoints, OPs, riot control, and mine clearing.

Military police make excellent instructors for roadblocks, checkpoints, and riot control. Engineers are experts at mine clearing. Observation posts at squad level require training because this is not a combat mission and there are no battle drills for it. The infantry squad will need time to work out the different roles required. Preparation time will differ with each mission. Four weeks is probably the least and three months the most time needed (including deployment preparation).

One of the drawbacks to a peacekeeping mission is that the force may not have the time to conduct their usual combat training. For extended peacekeeping missions, this could degrade the task force's combat readiness. For this reason, most U.S. peacekeeping forces rotate every six months.

By contrast, peacemaking operations should be continuous—perhaps beginning before a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation and extending well beyond. It is important to remember that the success of any peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation depends on the diplomatic means of settling the differences and hostilities between the combatant nations.

The major distinction in regard to peace-enforcement operations is that they are combat operations. Depending upon the mission, a light or heavy force may be needed. We have seen lately that a heavy-light mix gives us the most flexibility. The point is that a fully equipped combat force with CS and CSS attachments is required.

Examples of peace-enforcement actions are Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia. Peace-enforcement missions include, among others, cordon and search, search and attack, squad and platoon size patrolling, air assault operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), live fire raids, and establishing base camps and logistical support. Implied tasks include operating with armored forces, employing close air support, clearing mines, and operating as part of a coalition.

Battle drills are an excellent starting point for training in these tasks. The focus needs to be on decentralized operations with direct responsibility to the squad leader. Scheduling MOUT and air assault training would also be beneficial, as would an emphasis on search and attack, raids, and patrolling.

The one mission that is not taught or trained much is cordon and search. In fact, the Jungle Warfare School at Ft. Sherman, Panama, is one of the few training areas that incorporate it into their program of instruction. Training in command and control and mine clearing can be conducted as it is presently done for peacekeeping missions.

The benefit of peace-enforcement operations is that the preparation time is greatly reduced. If called upon with little or no notice, a unit can usually accomplish the mission without much additional training. But the more time a unit has, the better it can prepare its forces by focusing on the missions listed. Another advantage of peace-enforcement operations is that the task force can train and often execute their usual wartime missions.

Peacekeeping operations differ with each situation; the sequence of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement may also differ. The result is several tasks being combined. If the forces do not rotate, then the peace-enforcement units may also be called upon to perform peacekeeping tasks. It may be possible to tailor or alter the force on the basis of the specific mission. Other possibilities include the handoff of responsibility to a UN force, but this is an issue yet to be resolved. The most difficult situation to prepare for would be peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations, because the environment might prevent leaders from knowing until the last minute exactly what the task force configuration should be.

One of the most critical aspects of a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation is defining the rules of engagement (ROEs). For units serving as part of the UN, most peacekeeping operations are under Chapter 6 of the UN charter. The interpretation of this chapter states that the peacekeeping force will fire in self-defense only if fired upon. Most peace-enforcement operations, such as that in Somalia, are under UN charter, Chapter 7. The interpretation of this chapter states that a peace-enforcement force may fire at anyone who fires or poses a hostile intent to hurt a member of the peace-enforcement force or another citizen of that country.

Part of the training process for any peacekeeping operation must therefore be ROEs. Creating different scenarios or situations to help soldiers practice the ROEs will help clarify in their minds the situations in which they can or cannot fire. The time to learn this is before coming under fire or getting into a situation that could cost a life.

The role infantrymen will play in the new world order is unclear. Will that role be part of the UN or a regional coalition? In what size and configuration should a task force be deployed? But it is safe to assume that a battalion task force will be the minimum size used, with a brigade task force as the standard. Forces may be placed on standby for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. One thing that is clear is that we have to review our priorities for training.

We do not expect to face a major force in a full-scale war any time soon. We are more likely to find ourselves in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement role, which will definitely be a joint operation, possibly a multinational or coalition force.

Commanders should examine their training and make sure they are ready to face the future. They owe it to their soldiers to ensure that they are ready to face any mission they may be assigned in the interest of creating or maintaining a peaceful environment for others.

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